RECENT CASES.
AGENcY-LIABILITY OF MEMBERS OF A TRADE UNION FOR THE AcTs OF
THEIR OFFICERs.-The case of Lawlor v. Loewe, 187 Fed. Rep. 522 (I1I),

is interesting rather by reason of the facts of the case than because of any
unique principle of law declared therein. The "Danbury Hatters," manufacturers, brought a suit under the Sherman Act, against the individual members of a large union known as the United Hatters of North America for
damages caused by an unlawful boycott, effectuated through the efforts of
the officers of the union. The court found that the boycott was a conspiracy
in restraint of trade within the meaning of the Act; but that the evidence
failed to establish any liability on the part of the defendants since it failed
to show that the unlawful acts of the union's officers were authorized or
acquiesced in by these individual members.
It is elementary law that a principal is liable only for such acts of his
agent as he impliedly or expressly authorizes or ratifies. Huffcut on Agency,
Chap. XIII. It is difficult to recover damages from the members of unincorporated associations for acts done by the officers thereof since it is practically
impossible to prove actual knowltdge and authorization on the part of any
single individual. In states where there is a statute permitting suits to be
brought against unincorporated associations in their trade name or in the
name of their officers, this difficulty has been in part avoided and damages
have been recovered from the association where it has been shown that the
officers acted unlawfully with the authority of the majority of the members.
Schneider v. Local Union, 116 La. 270 (i9o6); Connell v. Stalker, 21 Misc.
Rep. 6og (N. Y. 1897); Cotton J. & L. Asso. v. Taylor, 56 S. V. Rep. 553
(Tex. igoo). No such statute applies in the Federal courts, so this suit was
properly brought against the individual members. Seattle Brewing & Malting Co. v. Hansen, 144 Fed. Rep. iOm (i9o5).
CARRIERs-FoRM OF ACTIoN FOR WRONGFUL EJECTION OF PASSENGERS.-

In Baltimore & Ohio R. R. v. Thornton, 188 Fed. 868 (1911), the plaintiff
purchased a ticket to a certain city but the ticket agent of the defendant
failed to punch it to indicate the destination. The conductor refused to
accept it and ejected the plaintiff who sued for damages. It was argued for
the defendant that the ticket being invalid, the ejection was not wrongful.
The court, in affirming judgement on a verdict for the plaintiff, declared that
the ticket was valid upon its face and pointed out a distinction which previous
decisions fully justify, and which serves to reconcile cases considered contrary. The distinction is this, that although as between the conductor and
passenger, the ticket is conclusive evidence of the contract, yet if the ticket
is invalid upon its face, the conductor is not bound to accept the explanation
of the passenger where it is contradictory to the terms on the face of the
ticket; and if the passenger is ejected (of course without more force than
is necessary) he is precluded from any action of tort since the ejection was
not wrongful, and his only remedy is on the contract. Railroad Co. v. Hill,
54 S. E. Rep. 872 (Va. igo6); McGhee v. Reynolds, 23 S. Rep. 68 (Ala.
1898); Brown v. Rapid Ry., 137 Mich. 591 (i9o3); Mosher v. Railway, 127
U. S. 390 (1887). But where the ticket shows that a mistake has been made
by the ticket seller, and the passenger's explanation is not contradicted by
the ticket, then the conductor is bound to accept the explanation, and if he
ejects the passenger the latter has a right to recover in tort for the wrongful
ejection. Frederick v. R. R., 37 Mich. 342 (1878); Murdock v. R. R., 137
Mass. 293 (1884); Erie R. R. v. Littell, 128 Fed. 546 (1904); Arnold v.
Rhode Island Co., 66 Atl. Rep. 6o (R. I. .o97); and the principal case.
See also 4 Elliott on Railroads, secs. 1594, I594a; Moore, Carriers, page 742,
sec. 8; Hutchinson, Carriers, 3rd edition, sec. 14o3; sec. xo6i, et seq.
(345)
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CONTRACTS-AGREEMENT

TO STOP TRAINS

VOID

AS

AGAINST

PUBLIC

Pomcy.-In Ford v. Oregon Electric Ry. Co., 117 Pac. Rep. 8o9 (Oregon
1911), the plaintiff brought a bill in equity to enforce the performance of a
contract made between the defendant railway company and the devisor of
the plaintiff. In the deed conveying the right of way the railway company
covenanted to stop local trains for the accommodation of passengers at a
certain crossing on the land of the plaintiff. The court held that the covenant was such as ran with the-land and could ordinarily be enforced by the
grantor's devisee; but that this covenant was void as being against public
policy. Hence specific performance was refused. The action of the court
in refusing specific performance is supported by the case of Conger v. N. Y.
W. S. & B. I. Co., 12o N. Y. 29 (i89), where the court found that the contract would delay further traffic and not promote public convenience, and
remitted the plaintiffs to their action at law for damages for breach of contract; but in declaring the contract void Ford v. Ry. Co. is contra to the
weight of authority. A contract by a railroad company to locate a depot
at a certain place, is not void as being against public policy, where there is
no restriction or prohibition against any other locality. Lyman v. Suburban
R. Co., 190 Ill. 320 (igoi); Louisville, N. A. & C. R. Co. v. Sumner, lO6
Ind. 55 (1885); Missouri P. R. Co. v. Tygard, 84 Mo. 263 (1884); International & G. N. R. Co. v. Dawson, 62 Tex. 26o (1884). Such a contract
is enforceable against the railroad company as long as it is possible for the
company to discharge the duties owed by it to the public, and at the same
time discharge the duties incumbent upon it by the contract. Atlantic, etc.,
R. R. Co. v. Camp, 13o Ga. I (I9O8).
A few jurisdictions hold that an agreement to establish a depot at a
particular point, is illegal, since it is the duty of a quasi public agency, independent of any agreement, to establish its stations at points most convenient
for the public interest; and any agreement which restricts the performance of
such duty is against public policy. Burney v. Ludeling, 47 La. Ann. 73 (1895);
Enid, etc., Co. v. Lile, I5 Okla. 317 (195).

CONTRACTS-STATUTE OF FRAuDs--,"AGREEMENTS NOT TO BE PERFORMED
WITHIN ONE YEAR."--The defendant verbally engaged the plaintiff to work for

a term of two years, either party having the right to terminate the engagement

at any time, upon six months' notice. in a suit upon this contract, the defendant contended that it came within Section 4 of the Statute of Frauds (29
Car. II), "agreements not to be performed within one year from the making
thereof." It was held that agreements for a defined term of more than a
year are not taken outside the Statute by the existence of a power to terminate by notice before a year has passed. Hanau v. Ehrlich, 1911, 2 K. B.
6
IO5 .

If the time of completion of a contract depends on a contingency which
may happen within a year, it is an agreement not within the Statute. Peter
v. Compton, I Smith's Leading Cases (9th Ed.), 586; Warner v. Railway
Co., 164 U. S. 43o (i896). But in England it has always been held that the
existence of a power to determine by notice, even within a year, does not
take the contract out of the operation of the Statute, on the theory that the
exercise of such an option is a right or privilege, and not a "contingency."
Dobson v. Collis, I Hurl. & N. 8i (1856); Ex parte, Acraman, 31 L. J. 741
(Chancery, 1862) ; Lavalette v. Riches, 24 Times L. PL 336 (i9o8).
In this country the jurisdictions are in conflict, although the precise point
has come up only infrequently. The English rule, holding that contracts
containing options to terminate at any time upon notice are nevertheless
within the Statute, is followed in Harris v. Porter, 2 Harr. 27 (Del. i84r);
Meyer v. Roberts, 46 Ark. 8o (i885); Biest v. Shoe Co., 97 Mo. App. 137
(i9o2), approved in Keller v. Fertilizer Co., 153 Mo. App. 126 (igio); and
Wagniere v. Dunnell, 29 R. I. 58o (igog).
In New York and Massachusetts such options take the contract outside
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the Statute. Blake v. Voigt, 134 N. Y. 69 (1892); Roberts v. Rockbottom,
7 Met. 46 (Mass. 1843).
On principle, the English rule seems the sounder, as it is just such contracts which provoke disputes, and should be reduced to writing.
CONTRACTs-STATUTE OF LImITATIONs.-Two persons entered into a contract by the terms of which the plaintiff was to take care of the decedent
for life, in return for which the decedent agreed to pay the plaintiff a sum
of money by will. Shortly afterwards the decedent left the plaintiff and
never returned. She left the plaintiff nothing in her will. Six years elapsed
between the time when the decedent departed and her death. In an action
for the sums of money, the judgment of the lower court in favor of the
defendant was reversed. Ga Nun v. Palmer, 96 N. E. Rep. 99 (N. Y. 1911).
The court assumed that the departure of the decedent amounted to notice to
the plaintiff that the decedent would not fulfil her promise to leave the plaintiff the sum of money. The general rule is that the renunciation of a contract by one of the parties, before the time for performance has come, discharges the other, and entitles him to sue at once for a breach. Roehm v.
Horst, 178 U. S. 1 (1899); Hocking v. Hamilton, I58 Pa. St. io7 (1893);
Contra: Porter v. Supreme Council, 183
Fox v. Kitton, 19 Ill. 519 (857).
Mass. 326 (Igo3).
Assuming that the breach was of such a character as to permit the
bringing of an action for damages, the question then arises as to whether
the plaintiff was bound to treat the contract as broken and bring her action.
Or might she, at her option, treat the contract as still in force, and wait until
the sum specified became due under its terms? This question was answered
in the affirmative, and therefore this action, brought within six years after
the decedent's death, was not barred by the statute of limitations, though
brought seven years after the technical breach.
The decision is sustained by the weight of authority. A person is not
bound to regard the renunciation of a person under contract as final. He
may elect to consider the contract as binding both on himself and on the
other party until the date fixed for performance. Hochster v. Delatour,
2 E. & B. 678 (185i); Kadish v. Young, io8 Ill. i7o (1883); Roebling's Sons'
Co. v. Fence Co., 13o Ill. 66o (1889).
COPYRIGHT-INFRINGEMENT OF RIGHTS IN A BOOK BY A MOVING PICTURE
Sitow.-A moving picture exhibition was recently classified by the Supreme
Court of the United States in Kalem Co. v. Harper Bros. et al., 32 Sup. Ct.
Rep. 2o (I911). The Kalem Co., engaged in the manufacture of moving
picture films, employed a man to read "Ben Hur," a copyrighted book, and to
write such a synopsis of it as could be acted in a short time. This was then
performed, and negatives of the performance were taken from which films
suitable for exhibition were produced. These films were advertised under
the title of "Ben Hur," and were sold to jobbers. The owners of the copyright of the book claimed that this was an infringement of their copyright.
By Rev. Stat. § 4952, as amended by the Act of March 3, 1891, U. S. Comp.
Stat. 1901, p. 3406, "Authors or their assigns shall have the exclusive right
to dramatize and translate any of their works for which copyright shall have
been obtained under the laws of the United States." The question, therefore, as to whether this copyright was infringed depends upon whether this
moving picture exhibition was a dramatization of "Ben Hur." The court
took the position that the absence of spoken words is not fatal to the existence of a drama, but that action alone is sufficient
What few decisions there are on the subject of the essentials of the drama
support this view. Thus, in Daly v. Palmer, 6 Blatchf. 256 (1868), the
court held that a written play, consisting of directions for its representation
by actions without the use of spoken language by the characters, is a
dramatic composition. In Jacks v. State, 22 Ala. 73 (853), the following
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language was used: "It may be conceded that its (the drama's) signification
is broad enough to cover any representation, in which a story is told, a
moral conveyed, or the passions portrayed, whether by words and actions
combined, or by mere actions alone." In Bell v. Mahn, 121 Pa. 225 (1888),
the court said that a drama "is a story represented by action"; adding that
"itisordinarily designed to be spoken, but it may be represented in pantoe. The court, in our principal case, went on to say that since a pantomine of "Ben Hur ' would be a dramatization thereof, it would be none the
less so because exhibited to the audience by means of a rapid succession of
pictures rather than by living characters. The copyright was, therefore. held
to have been infringed. On this last point there seem to be no decisions
at all, owing, no doubt, to the novelty of this phase of the moving picture
business.
To the argument that the manufacturing company did not produce
these representations to the public, but merely sold the films to jobbers, the
court replied that inasmuch as the company by its advertisement not only
expected, but invoked the use of its films for exhibition purposes, it had
contributed to the infringement. This is in accord with settled law. Harper v. Schoppell, 28 Fed. 613 (1886) ; Rupp Co. v. Elliott, 131 Fed. 73o (1904).
CoRpoRATIoNs-NEcEsSITY FOR A VOTE OF THE STOCKHOLDERS TO AUTHORIZE

GOING INTO BANKRUPTcY.-The directors of a company adopted a resolution

authorizing the filing of a petition in bankruptcy. The objection was raised
that a vote of the stockholders was necessary to authorize such action.
Held, the board of directors have, at a duly called meeting, the power to put
the corporation into bankruptcy. They have the care of its general business
and know whether it is able to continue or not, and a vote of the stockholders is unnecessary. In re Kenwood Ice Co., 189 Fed. 525 (1911).

Until June 25, 19IO, Act of Cong., 6Ist session, vol. 36, chap. 412, page

838, a corporation did not have a right to go into voluntary bankruptcy under
the National Bankruptcy Act. Therefore, the only authority on the question
in the principal case arises under the state laws and the cases under the involuntary section of the National Act.
The prevailing rule before the National Bankruptcy Act was, that in
case of insolvency of a corporation, the board of directors, at a duly called
meeting, might make an assignment for the benefit of their creditors without
a vote of the stockholders. Tripp v. Northwestern National Bank, 41 Minn.
4oo (1889); Ardesco Oil Co. v. N. A. Mining & Oil Co., 66 Pa. 375 (1870);
Sargent v. Webster, 13 Met. 497 (Mass. 1847). Under the section of the
National Bankruptcy Act which allows corporations to be put into involuntary
bankruptcy. In re Bates Machine Co., 91 Fed. 625 (1899), held that a board
of directors exceeded their authority in authorizing the treasurer of a corporation to make an admission of its willingness to be adjudged a bankrupt.
One of the grounds for this decision was that it was merely avoiding the
act, which did not allow voluntary bankruptcy. This objection has now been
removed by the amendment of June 25, 1910.

In re Burbank Co., 168 Fed. 719 (19o9), followed the Bates case without discussion.
CIIMES--,HOMICmE-CoNvICTION

OF VOLUNTARY MANSLAUGHTER ON AN

INDICTMENT FOR MuDER.-An indictment charged the accused with murder in

the first degree. The court charged the jury upon every degree of homicide,
including involuntary manslaughter, and the jury found the defendant guilty
of the latter offence. He appealed on the ground that the indictment dlid
not charge the crime found. Held, on an indictment for murder the jury
may find a verdict of guilty of any of the lower degrees of homicide. State
v. Averill, 81 At. 461 (Vt. 1911).
The question here, decided for the first time in Vermont, is in accord
with almost universal authority. At common law on a charge of homicide
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it Was necessary to prove only the killing, of course under circumstances not
involving se defendendo nor per infortuniam. If malice could be shown, the
verdict would be murder; if not, manslaughter. Salisbury's Case, I Plow.
io

(553);

Mackalley's Case, 9 Coke, 65b (I6I). This common law rule

has been adopted in nearly every American jurisdiction, either judicially or
by statute. People v. McDonald, 49 Hun, 67 (N. Y. I888); Watson v. State,
5 Mo. 497 (1838) ; King v. State, 5 How. 73o (Miss. 1841).
But in order that there may be a conviction of a lower degree of any
crime than that charged, the lesser offence must either necessarily be included
in the general charge of the greater or else the averments of the indictment
describing the manner in which the greater offence was committed must contain allegations essential to constitute a charge of the lesser. Watson v.
State, I6 Ga. 607 (I9o2); People v. Adams, 52 Mich. 24 (1883).
An exception to the general rule exists in Pennsylvania. This state still
clings to the old common law rule that where the indictment charges a felony,
there cannot be a conviction of a misdemeanor even though all the essential
elements of the latter are embraced in the former. Since, by statute, involuntary manslaughter has been reduced, in Pennsylvania, to a misdemeanor, it
follows that there can be no conviction of involuntary manslaughter on an
indictment for murder. Commonwealth v. Gable, 7 S.& R. 423 (Pa. 1821);
Waiters v. Com., 44 Pa. 135 (1862); Hilands v. Com., n4 Pa. 372 (1886).
In general, on an indictment for murder, it is proper for the court to
refuse to charge the jury that if there is no proof of the material allegation
of murder, the defendant should be acquitted. Smith v. State, 142 Ala. r4
(1905).
CRIMaS-REQUISITES

OF AN INDICTMENT FOR THE LARCENY OF MONEY.-

In People v. Hunt, 96 N. E. Rep. 220 (Ill. I9n), the defendant was indicted
for the larceny of "one pocketbook of the value of $I and $55 of good and
lawful money of the United States of America, a more particular description
of said personal property and money beihg to these grand jurors unknown."
The owner of the pocketbook and money testified that he had informed the
grand jury that the money was in bills, five $io bills and one $5 bill. The
defendant was convicted in the lower court. On appeal the verdict was
reversed on the ground that the description of the money in the indictment
was insufficient.
In the absence of statute, it is not sufficient if money is described only
by the aggregate amount, without any specification of the number, kind, or
denomination of the pieces or bills. Whether the coins were of gold or silver
should also be stated. Lord v. State, 20 N. H. 404 (845) ; People v. Ball, 14
Cal. ioi (1859) ; 2 Bishop on Crim. Proc., sec. 703. The reason for this rule
is that an accurate description of the property is essential to identify the
particular transaction' charged as criminal, so that the defendant may not be
put on trial for an offense different from that for which the grand jury has
found the bill.
Some courts have, however, followed a less strict rule, under which it
is held unnecessary to describe each piece of coin alleged to have been stolen.
Com. v. Grimes, io Gray, 47o (Mass. I858); Chisholm v. State, 45 Ala. 66
(871), holding that the number of pieces of coin, the denomination or the
kind, whether gold, silver, copper, or other material, is not a necessary
ingredient of an indictment for larceny of coin of the United States.
*
Under statutes in some states, viz., Kentucky, Indiana, Louisiana, Michigan, North Carolina, Ohio, Texas and Washington, (Encyclopedia of Pleading And Practice, Vol. 12, page 989, Notes 3 and 4), money may be sufficiently
described in general terms, without specifying the coin, number, denomination
or kind thereof, it being sufficient to describe it simply as money of a certain
amount. Rains v. State, I37 Ind. 83 (1893); State v. Walker, 22 La. Ann.
425 (i87o) ; Travis v. Com. 96 Ky. 77 (1894).

Where the description of the property is not known to the grand jury,
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the property may be described as particularly as the testimony of the witnesses will permit, and there the indictment may allege that further particulars are unknown to the grand jurors; but this is only where the particulars
could not have been ascertained by the exercise of ordinary diligence. 2
Bishop on Crim. Proc. § 705; 1 Bishop on Crim. Proc. § 549.
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE-,POVER

TO SUSPEND

SENTrENC.--Upon

conviction,

the defendant was sentenced to a fine and imprisonment, but as an act of
clemency the court suspended the execution of the sentence. Later the sentence was imposed and upon the defndant's writ of error it was held that
the court had no power to suspend the execution of the sentence already
pronounced for purpose of securing the good behavior of the convicted party;
that the power existed only where the accused seeks an appeal or pardon.
Spencer v. State, i4o S. W. Rep. 597 (Tenn. 1911).
At common law trial judges had power to suspend the imposition or
execution of sentence whenever justice required it, for the reason that they
could not grant new trials, nor was the verdict reviewable upon the facts by
any higher court. 2 Hale P. C. 412.
There is an important distinction between suspending the imposition of
sentence and suspending its execution; for the latter is an invasion of the
right of the executive to pardon. State v. Voss, 8o Iowa, 467 (1890) ; In re
Webb, 89 Wis. 354 (1895). The distinction, however, is technical, for if it
be conceded that a judge can suspend the imposition of sentence, he may, if
he chooses, very effectively deprive the executive of the right to pardon by
simply never pronouncing sentence.
It is everywhere conceded that the trial judge has power to suspend
imposing sentence for a limited time in order to decide upon the punishment,
or to give the prisoner the opportunity to appeal or move for new trial, or
because of the prisoner's insanity. People v. Barrett, 202 Ill. 287 (1903).
Even the execution of sentence may be suspended for the latter reasons.
In re Webb, supra; In re Williams, i5o Ala. 489 (19o7).
As to the power of a court to indefinitely suspend sentence for the purpose of securing the good behavior of the prisoner after his release, the cases
are in conflict. People v. Court of Sessions, 141 N. Y. 288 (1894), held that
the power exists. Contra: U. S. v. Wilson, 46 Fed. 748 (i891); In re Flint,
25 Utah, 338 (1903) ; People v. Barrett, supra, even on motion for new trial.
As to the power to suspend the execution of sentence as an act of
clemency, the weight of authority agrees with the principal case. Neal v.
State, io4 Ga. 509 (i898) ; State v. Abbott, 87 S. C. 467 (igio); Tanner v.
Wiggins, 54 Fla. 203 (907). Contra: Weber v. State, 58 Ohio, 616 (i898);
Ex parte Lee, 16 Ohio Dec. 259 (igo6).
DECEDENTS' EsTATEs-SURvvAL OF AcIoN UNDER PENNSYLVANIA STATuTE.-The Act of Feb. 24, 1834 (P. L. 77), excepts from actions which survive
to the personal representatives of a decedent "actions * * * for wrongs done
to the person." This clause has been construed in Smith v. L. V. R. R. Co.,
8I AtI. Rep. 554 (Pa. i91). There a wife recovered judgment for personal
injuries to herself, and, as executrix of the estate of her husband, who died
pending litigation, recovered judgment for his consequential losses. It was
held that the words quoted do not refer to a right of action, but to actions
for physical injuries done to the person of the plaintiff decedent. Accord:
Moe v. Smiley, 125 Pa. 136 (1889).
Before the Act of 1834, actions for personal injuries survived in some
cases. Penrod v. Morrison, 2 Pen. & W. 126 (Pa. 183o). Under that Act
all actions a decedent had a right to bring in his lifetime, survived to
his personal representatives, except actions for slander, libel and wrongs
done to the person. Miller v. Wilson, 24 Pa. 114, 122 (1854). In Birch v.
Pgh. Ry., 30 AtI. Rep. 826; 165 Pa. 339 (I895), the Acts of 1851 and 1855
were construed together as giving the right to bring suit after the death of
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a testator, to the husband, widow, children or parents, and in the absence
of any such, to the personal representatives, in whom also was vested the
right to continue any suits commenced by the testator in his lifetime, even
where the plaintiff's death was due to the injuries sued for. Maher v. P. T.
Co., 37 At]. 57i; 181 Pa. 391 (x897). And the guardians of minor children
are not entitled to any part of the proceeds, which become part of the estate
to be accounted for on audit. Taylor's Est., 36 Atl. Rep. 230; 179 Pa. 254
(I897). Where one of the relatives named sues, the proceeds are to be
divided among such relatives in the same proportion as is provided by law
for the distribution of the personalty of an intestate. Since the Act of i895,
the death of the wrongdoer does not terminate the right. Rodenbaugh v.
P. T. Co., 4z Atl. Rep. io Pa. 358 (1899).
DIVORcE-TEE

DosIciLE OF MATRIMONY

AS

DISTINGUISHED FROM

THE

PARTIES.-A man and woman were married in Mexico.
The husband deserted his wife, who moved over into Texas, and after
establishing a legal domicile there, sued for divorce. The husband could not
be found, so service was had by publication, according to the laws of Texas,
and the decree of divorce was granted. On appeal the husband contended
that the decree of divorce was void, as the action was in personan:, and
jurisdiction could not be acquired by constructive service. Held, that the
domicile of matrimony remains with the innocent party, and the other party
is held constructively present within the jurisdiction. Actions of divorce in
the court of the domicile of the innocent party are in rein, and the decrees
are binding in every state, under the "full faith and credit" clause of the
Fededal Constitution. A decree of the court of the guilty party is merely
in personam, and binding only in the state where granted. Montmorency v.
Montmorency, i39 S. W. Rep. 1168 (Tex. i911).
In Haddock v. Haddock, 201 U. S. 562 (igo5), a decree granted by the
court of the domicile of the guilty party was held not binding upon the
court of a different state. The two cases are complementary, and conform
to the rule proposed in the principal cage: that the innocent party can obtain
a decree binding in every state, while the guilty party can obtain one binding only in the state where granted.
The Texas decision announces the curious proposition that some divorce
actions are in personan, and some in rem. But this is due to the distinction
between the marriage status and the persons married. If the domicile of
matrimony remains with. the innocent party, the court of that domicile has
jurisdiction over the status, and can issue a decree in rein, binding in every
court. Any other court, as for instance that of the domicile of the guilty
party, can touch only the person married, not the status itself, so that its
decree is merely it personam.
DOMIcILE OF THE

EviDENcE-LDEL-ADSISSlILITY IN EVIDENCE OF A PLEA OF JUSTIFICATION
AFTER ITS WITHDRAWAL, TO PROVE MALicE.-In an action of libel the defend-

ant put in a plea that the statements were true. This plea was withdrawn
at the opening of the trial. The court held that the plea of justification was
evidence to be considered by the jury as a circumstance aggravating the
damages. Ruskin v. Arnum, 8i Atl. Rep. 342 (N. J. Ig1).
Under the old common law in actions of libel or slander, when truth
was set forth as a plea, if it was not proved, it was a deliberate reiteration
of the slanderous or libellous words and was conclusive evidence of malice.
From this ruling the courts even went further and held that any evidence
which in any way claimed the truth of the statements was unavailale in
mitigation of damages. Fero v. Ruscoe, 4 N. Y. 162 (1850).
The harshness of the rule soon led to its abolishment. Either by statute
or decisions the law has finally adopted the almost universal proposition that
where truth of words spoken is pleaded in justification, in good faith, under
an honest belief in their truth and with reasonable grounds for such belief,
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the plaintiff is not, by reason of any such plea, on failure of the defendant's
proof to sustain it, entitled to exemplary damages; nor should the damages
be increased by this circumstance. Rayner v. Kinney, 14 Ohio St. 283 (1862);
Lowe v. Herald, 6 Utah, 175 (1889) ; Pollet v. Sargent, 36 N. H. 496 (1858):
Spooner v. Keeler, 51 N. Y. 527 (1873). Many jurisdictions go further and
hold that the plea is no longer a part of the record, and cannot, therefore,
.be read as evidence. Gilmore v. Borders, 2 How. 824 (Miss. 1838); Shirley
v. Keathy, 4 Caldwells, 29 (Tenn. -1867).
A recent decision in accord with the principal case is Fodor v. Fuchs,
79 N. J. L. 529 (191o).
MECHANICS' LIEN-CONSTITUTIONALITY OF PENNSYLVANIA

STATUTE.-One

more section of the Pennsylvania Mechanics' Lien Act of June 4, 1901 (P. L.
by the Supreme Court of the state in
431), has been declared unconstitutional
Page v. Carr, 81 Atl. 43 o, 1911. This latest section to come under the ban is
section i3,giving to mechanics' liens priority over advance money mortgages.
Prior sections declared unconstitutional are: Sec. 28, giving to a sub-contractor
or materialman the right to issue an attachment execution against the owner
or other party indebted to the contractor for labor or materials furnished,
Vulcanite Cement Co. v. Allison, 220 Pa. 382 (i9o8); Section 36, providing
for the enforcement of the judgment on the lien by a special fi. fa. under the
Act of April 7, 1870, Vulcanite Paving Co. v. Transit Co., 220 Pa. 603 (9o8) ;
Section 38, permitting mechanics' liens to be filed against a building, without
reference to the land, and providing for the sale and removal of the building for the benefit of lienholders, Lumber Co. v. Carnegie Institute, 225 Pa.
486 (igog); Section 35, giving the right to enter a personal judgment
against a contractor who has been served with the original scire facias, or
any scire facias to revive. Sterling Bronze Co. v. Improvement Ass'n, 226
Pa. 475 (910).

The point of conflict between the Act and the Constitution of 1874, is
Art. 3, § 7 of the latter, providing that "the General Assembly shall not pass
any general or special law * * * providing or changing methods for the
collection of debts, or the enforcing of judgments, or prescribing the effect
of judicial sales of real estate." Inasmuch as mechanics' liens had no preference over advance money mortgages prior to the Constitution, this section of
the Act of 19O1 does, of course, accomplish the result forbidden in the
Constitution.
Incidentally, the court overruled the additional objection to the Act,
entertained by the Common Pleas Court, that the subject of the statute was
not clearly expressed in the title, following what was said by Elkins, J., in
Gilbert's Estate, 227 Pa. 648 (igio): "It has been decided, over and over
again, that the title need not be a general index to the contents of an Act,
but that it is sufficient if it relates to one general subject, no matter how the
details may be multiplied, provided they are subordinate'to the general purpose of the Act and germane to its provisions." .
MECHANIcs' LIENS-ExTENT TO WHIcH THEY APPLY TO THE PROPERTY OF

bishop of the Catholic Church contracted for
the construction of an orphanage. He acquired the property individually, but
under the laws of the church he was morally and ecclesiastically bound to
use it only for charitable and religious purposes. Held, in a per curiam opinion reversing a previous decision, that the property was not exempt from
statutory mechanics' liens on the ground that it was a public charity.
CHARITABLE INSTITUTIoNs.-A

Morris v. Nowlin Lumber Co., 140 S. W. Rep. I (Ark. 1911).

In the light of previous Arkansas decisions on this subject it is rather
difficult to understand exactly how this determination was reached, although
a review of the cases in other jurisdictions indicates that it is generally
considered sound. Under the mechanics' lien statute in practically all the
states, had the bishop held this property absolutely in his own right there
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could have been no question as to the enforcibility of the lien. Upon their
first consideration of the case, the court held that equity would imply a
trust in the bishop for the use of the church. In this holding they are
supported by abundant authority. Mannix v. Purcell, 46 Ohio St. io2 (1888) ;
McDonald v. Tyner, 84 Ark. i89 (Igo7); Condit v. Maxwell, 142 Mo. 274
(i897); Pomeroy's Eq. Jur. Sec. 155. Then, following the decision of
Eureka Stone Co. v. First Christian Church, 86 Ark. 213 (i9o8), which
expressly holds that a church is a charitable institution, and as such, exempt
from statutory liens, the court held, and it would seem correctly, that the
orphanage which had been shown to be open to the public, was as much
a public charity as a church, and therefore exempt from statutory liens.
The exact reason for receding from this position is not stated in the
per curiam opinion.
Why a church should be considered a public charity is not made clear
in any of the opinions holding it to be such. In the great majority of
jurisdictions churches are as much the subject of mechanics' liens as any
other buldings. Jones v. Mt. Zion Congregation, 3o La. Ann. 711 (878);
Lumber Co. v. Washburn, 29 Ore. i5o (1896); Presbyterian Church v.
Allison, io Pa. 413 (1849). For an oft-quoted discussion of what constitutes
a charitable institution, see opinion by Paxson, J., in Fire Insurance Patrol
v. Boyd, i2o Pa. 624 (i888).
NuiSANCE-JoINDER OF DEFENDANTs.-Eighteen defendants acting individually, by building bridges and constructing banks obstructed the flow of
water in a creek and backed it up on the plaintiff's property. He sued at law
for damages, making the eighteen tort-feasors joint defendants. It was
held that where the wrongs of several parties contribute to the plaintiff's
harm, they are liable jointly only if they have acted in concert. If they have
acted independently, each is liable only to the extent of the injury caused
by his own individual act, and the fact that it is difficult to determine the
proportion of the aggregate harm caused by his separate act, does not affect
the rule or make one defendant liable for the acts of others. Tackaberry Co.
v. Sioux City Co., 132 N. W. Rep. 945 (Iowa, 1911).
Persons who act in concert in causing or continuing a nuisance may be
sued jointly at law. Simmons v. Everson, 26 N. E. Rep. giI (N. Y. i891).
But where the defendants are joined, the action will fail unless the wrong
complained of is joint. Keyes v. Gold Co., 58 Cal. 724 (1879). If it is several,
each defendant is liable only to the extent of the wrong committed by him.
Chipman v. Palmer, 77 N. Y. 51 (1879). In Sadler v. Great Western Ry. Co.,
2 Q. B. 688 (1895), and Lull v. Fox, ig Wis. IOO (1865), this rule was
applied to cases where the wrong complained of was the maintenance of a
nuisance on a stream, as in the principal case.
In equity, it is possible to join as defendants several tort-feasors whose
independent acts have contributed to the same injury. Thorpe v. Brumfitt,
8 L. R. Ch. App. 654 (1871). It has been suggested that the proper course
would seem to be to bring separate equity actions and apply to have them
tried together. Garrett, Law of Nuisances, 3rd Ed. 254.
In Pennsylvania, when suit is brought against two defendants for joint
negligence, there can be no recovery where there is no community of fault.
.Sturzebecker v. The Inland Co., 211 Pa. I56 (I9O5) ; and see, further, P. &
L. Dig. Dec. Vol. I6, Col. 27798.

PARTNERSHIP-LIABILITY OF A PARTNER TO AccOUNT FOR THE PROFITS
OF AN ILLEGAL CONTRAc.-Two persons entered into a partnership agree-

ment for the purchase and sale of coal lands. The acquisition of part of
these lands was illegal. On a bill for an accounting by one partner, it was
held that to decree division of the profits would be in substance to enforce
an illegal contract. Kennedy v. Lonabaugh, 117 Pac. Rep. io79 (Wyoming,
19r).
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The proposition that. a court of law will not enforce the performance
of an illegal contract is practically universal. Miller v. Larsen, Ig Wis. 463
(1865); Alford v. Burke, 21 Ga. 46 (1857); Low v. Hutchison, 37 Me. I96
(1853). When it comes to determining, however, what constitutes an
enforcement of an illegal contract the courts differ. A number of jurisdictions have held that where the subject matter of the illegal contract has
been completed and the profits arising therefrom have been acquired, a
court of equity will compel a division of the profits between the parties.
Crescent Insurance Co. v. Bear, 23 Fla. 50 (1887) ; Wilson v. Owen, 3o Mich.
474 (1874); Gilliam v. Brown, 43 Miss. 641 (I87I). These courts hold
that this is not an enforcement of an illegal contract but that a new
contract arises. One partner when he receives the money does so on an
implied promise of division. But the weight of authority seems to hold that
it is not the duty of the court to divide the spoils of illegal contracts between the wrongdoers. Spies v. Rosenstock, 87 Md. 14 (I898); Central
Trust and Safe Deposit Co. v. Respass, 112 Ky. 6o6 (19o2); Dunham v.
Presby, 120 Mass. 285 (1876). A number of the cases which refuse to allow
an accounting discuss and repudiate the theory of presumed promise.
Where a contract consists of two distinct facts readily severable and not
in any material sense depending on each other, one part being legal and the
other illegal the rule is to enforce that part which is valid. Gelpeck v. City
of Dubuque, 68 U. S. 221 (1863) ; Leavit v. Blatchford, 5 Barb. 9 (N. Y.
1848) ; Treadwell v. Davis, 34 Cal. 6oi (1868).
It is not necessary in most jurisdictions for the question of illegality to
appear in the pleadings. The court's duty in most jurisdictions is to refuse
its aid to enforce a contract which is in violation of law or against public
policy. Oscanyan v. Winchester Repeating Arms, io3 U. S. 261 (i88o);
Prost v. More, 4o Cal. 346 (i87o) ; Sheldon v. Pruesner, 52 Kan. 579 (1894).
POSTAL LAws-NEGOTIABILITY OF MONEY O, R.-A postal clerk fraudulently issued postal money orders, and cashed them at the bank of the
defendant. Defendant, without knowledge of the fraud, in turn received
their vale from the Post Office. Upon discovery of the clerk's fraud, the
Government sued the banker, under Rev. St., Sec. 4057, for the difference
between the amount of the clerk's bond and the amount of the fraudulent
orders. The bank defended on the ground that it was an innocent holder
for value of commercial paper. Held, that postal money orders were not
intended to be and are not negotiable instruments, and are not subject to the
defenses permitted by the law merchant to innocent holders for value
Bolognesi, et al., v. U. S., 189 Fed. 335 (Igr1).
This decision is sustained by the Postal Regulations covering the postal
money order system, as they impose restrictions which are inconsistent with

negotiability.

Sections

dorsement is permitted.

lOO2-ioo9.

For instance, no more than one en-

See also U. S. v. Stockgrowers' National Bank, 3o

Fed. 912 (1887).

The American postal money order system is modeled after the English
system; and in England too, in Fine Art Society v. Union Bank, 17 L. R.
Q. B. 705 (886) it has been decided that postal money orders are not
negotiable instruments.
PROPERTY-CONTINGENT RETAINDRS.-Certain realty was devised to A
and his wife for life; and at their death to the children of A "who shall
be living at that time," and the issue of any child of A who may have
then deceased. Held, that the interests of the children of A, living at
testator's death, were at that time contingent, not vested, remainders.
Birdsall v. Birdsall, 132 N. W. Rep. 8og (Iowa, 1911).
The result of this case depended on whether fhe clause "who shall
be living at the time," was meant to create a condition precedent or subsequent. Ducker v. Burnham, 146 Ill. 9 (1893). It was conceded, on argu-
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ment, and seems quite clear, that the testator meant to give to those
children who should be living at the death of A or his wife, whoever
should servive; but that still leaves the question undecided as to the nature
of the interests which such children took, as were living, at the time the
testator died. The general test to be applied has been stated by Gray, Rule
Against Perpetuities, Sec. io8, as follows: "If the conditional element has
been incorporated into the description of, or into the gift to, the remainderman, then the remainder is contingent; but if, after words giving a vested
interest, a clause is added divesting it, the remainder is vested." There is
also to be considered the well-settled policy of the courts to construe a
remainder as vested rather than contingent, if there is doubt in the matter.
Blanchard v.Blanchard, I Allen (Mass.) 223 (i86I). The decision in the
principal case is based on the conclusion that the .condition was precedent
and the persons who were to take were unascertained at the time the testator
died. This brings the case within Fearne's fourth class of contingent
remainders, which are described as those "where the person to whom the
remainder is limited is not yet ascertained, or not yet in being." Fearne,
Contingent Remainders, p. 4. The construction here adopted is very generally supported, though the question may be a close one in some cases.
Ducker v. Burnham, 146 Ill. 9 (1893); dicta in Smaw v. Young, iog Ala.
528 (1895) ; Price v. Hall, L. R. 5 Eq. 399 (1868) ; Delbert's Appeal, 83 Pa. 462
(1877); Thomson v. Ludington, io4 Mass. 193 (1870); Gray, Rule Against
The
Perpetuities, Sec. io8; In re Moran's Will, 1x8 Wis. 177 (903).
subject is discussed at length in a note to Robertson v. Guenther, 25 L. R.
A. (N. S.) 888.
PROPERTY-CNENANTS RUNNING WITH THE LAND.-The owners of adjoining properties indirectly derived title from a common grantor who had
owned considerable land in the vicinity, but had never resided there. The
defendant's predecessor in title covenanted with the grantor to build a hotel
but not closer than a certain distance from the boundaries of the premises.
The plaintiff's deed had a similar restriction, but no obligation to build.
The plaintiff sought to enjoin the defendant from extending the hotel up
to the boundary line, as this would shut up the windows in the wall of the
plaintiff's house. Held, a restrictive covenant in a deed in which it does
not appear that it was made for the benefit of the land to which the plaintiff
has title, cannot be enforced in equity at his instance. Berryman v. Hotel
Savoy, 117 Pac. 677 (Cdl. i91i).
At law, all covenants are binding, at least upon the parties to them,
but those covenants which run with the land are also binding upon subsequent transferees of the land. In order that a covenant shall run with the
land, it must in its nature "touch or concern the land," Spencer's Case, $
Co., I6a (583), and privity of estate must have existed between the
original parties. Gilmer v. Mobile Ry., 79 Ala. 569 (885); Hurd v. Curtis,
19 Pick. 459 (Mass. 1837). Privity of estate is unnecessary in only one
class of case-where the burden, corresponding to the benefit of the covenant, attaches to a person and not to another piece of land. National Bank
v. Segur, 39 N. J. L. 173 (1877); Shaber v. St. Paul Water Co., 3o'Minn. 179
(I883). A covenant relating to a thing in esse binds transferees, but if the
thing is not in esse they are not bound unless it is so stipulated. Spencer's
Case, supra; Minshull v. Oakes, 2 H. & N. 793 (Eng. 1858).
In equity, building restrictions will be enforced against one who purchases or occupies the land with notice of the restrictions and in such cases,
the agreement need not be under seal, nor run with the land, nor is privity
of estate necessary. Tulk v. Moxhay, 2 Phil. 714 (Eng. 1848). But it is
essential for the plaintiff, in order to enforce such restrictions, to prove
that they were to enure to the benefit of the land which he owns. Sharp v.
Ropes, iio Mass. 381 (1872); Hutchinson v. Thomas, igo Pa. 242 (I899).
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TAXATION-JURISDICTION TO TAX A VassFxL.-In Southern Pacific Com-

pany v. Kentucky, 32 Sup. Ct. Rep. 13 (i91I), it was held that a ship is
subject to taxation in the state where the owner is domiciled provided it has
not acquired an actual situs in some other state; and the enrollment of the
ship at a port in that other state does not give it a situs there.
In stating that the taxable situs must be that of the domicile of the
owner unless an actual situs has .been acquired elsewhere, the principal case
is entirely in accord with the authorities. Hays v. Pacific Mail Co., 17 How.
596 (1854); Ayer v. Kentucky, 202 U. S. 409 (i9o5); People v. Commissioners, 58 N. Y. 242 (1874); Olson v. San Francisco, 148 Cal. 80 (19o5).
Cases holding that the ship could not be taxed by the state where the owner
was domiciled on the ground that the ship had acquired an actual situs
elsewhere, are Old Dominion v. Virginia, 198 U. S. 299 (19o4); North
American Dredging Co. v. Taylor, 56 Wash. 565 (191o); National Dredging
Co. v. State, 99 Ala. 462 (1892).
The principal case seems to hold that if a ship has not acquired an
actual situs, the state of the domicile of the owner may tax it even if the
ship has never entered or could not possibly enter that state. In Union
Transit Co. v. Kentucky, 199 U. S. 194 (19o5), it was held that a state could

not tax such property, although there is no indication that an actual situs
had been acquired elsewhere. The court in the principal case tried to show
that its decision was in accord with the case mentioned, but the latter
would seem to be contra. At any rate in American Mail Co. v. Crowell,
76 N. J.L. 54 (i9o8), the court held that a state could not impose a tax
upon a ship which had never been in the state and cited Union Transit Co. v.
Kentucky, supra, saying that they were bound by' that decision.
On principle these cases are hard to justify for if the state of the
domicile of the owner cannot tax a ship which has not elsewhere acquired
an actual situs, it will entirely escape taxation. Furthermore such a test
would excuse from taxation large steamships, and render smaller craft liable.
TORTS-CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE AS AFFECTING DAMAGES IN ADMIRALTY

LAw.-A gasoline launch, after reaching the middle of a river, became
disabled and drifted with the current. When it was opposite a wharf, a large
river steamer backed out into the launch and sunk it. It appeared that
each boat was negligent, the launch in not having and blowing certain
required whistles, and the steamer in not maintaing a proper lookout. In an
action by the owner to recover the value of his launch it was held that the
admiralty rule applies: if both of the colliding vessels are negligent, each
must pay one-half the resulting loss. St. Louis Packet Co. v. Murray, 139
S. W.

Rep. 1O78 (Ky. 1911).

The rule, as set forth in this decision, is the general rule of admiralty
where damage is caused by the negligence of one vessel, but the injured
ship contributed to it. The Catharine v. Dickinson, 58 U. S. 170 (1854);
The Ant, io Fed. :94 (1882); The Albert Dumvis, 177 U. S.240 (9oo).
The same rule as to the division of damages does not apply, where there
is a reasonable doubt as to which vessel was in fault, but the loss must
remain where it has fallen. Pettitt v. Kallisto, 2 Hughes, 128 (U. S. C. C.
1877). And where a collision occurs by the wilful fault or intentional
wrong of both parties, the damages will not be apportioned, but the libel
will be dismissed. The R. L. Maybey, 4 Blatchf. 88 (U. S. C C. 1857).
If a third party is damaged by a collision between two vessels, where
there is negligence in both, he may recover the full amount of hi damage
from either vessel, but that vessel may recover half of what it is compelled to pay from the owners of the other ship. The Job T. Wilson, 84 Fed.
204 (1897); The Atlas, 93 U. S. 302 (1876).
TORTs-LBEL-PRIILEGED
COMMTNiCATION.-The defendant wrote a
letter to the plaintiff's superior in the municipal government, in which the
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plaintiff was charged with scoundrelism, incompetency, corruption, buffoonery,
despotism, lawlessness, and in being possessed with the most dangerous and
destructive delusion that an official can entertain in a free government. The
communication was sent for publication to the newspapers before its receipt by the plaintiff's superior. The defendant in his answer alleged that
the matters of fact referred to were true, and that the opinion expressed,
was fair comment on the acts of the plaintiff. The court held this a plea of
privilege rather than justification and sustained the plaintiff's demurrer.
Bingham v. Gaynor, 96 N. E. Rep. 84 (N. Y., 1911).
It is universally held that a plea in justification to a vague general
charge, libellous per se, must be as broad as the charge and must set forth
the specific facts which the defendant means to prove in order to substantiate his charge. Zerenberg v. Labouchere, 2 Q. B. 183 (1893); Odgers
on Libel and Slander, 4th Edit., p. 173; 13 Ency. of Plead. & Pract. 82.
Under the common law, privilege may be pleaded under the general issue,
Bradley v. Heath, 12 Pick (Mass) 163, (1831) ; but under the codes,
privilegg must be pleaded specially. Hess v. Sparks, 44 Kan. 470 (189o);
13 Ency. of Plead. & Pract., page 88.
The important part of the opinion in Bingham v. Gaynor, supra, is the
discussion of what constitutes fair comment on the acts of public officials.
In line with the general authority the court held that a person having an
interest, as a citizen, in a public official, may make a statement to the
superior of the person to whom the communication refers, and will not be
liable even for untrue statements, if they are made in good faith. Coogler v.
Rhoads, 38 Fla. 240 (1897); Dennehy v. O'Connell, 66 Conn. 175 (895).
Publication in a newspaper before receipt by the superior, however, destroys
the privilege. Odgers on Libel & Slander, 263 and cases cited. Fair and
honest criticism of a public officer is privileged; but such privilege will not
protect the writer if he makes false statements. Neither does it extend
to attacks upon private character Clifton v. Lange, 79 N. W. Rep. 276
(Iowa, 1899); Wood v. Boyle, 177 Pa. 62.o (1896). See Woodward v.
Lander, 6 Car. & P. 548 (1834) for the effect of violent language used in the
complaint.
TORTS-MEASURE

OF DAMAGES

FOR CONVERSION BY

INNOCENT

TRns-

PASsER.-A third party innocently went upon the plaintiff's land, cut down the

latter's trees and, after transpbrting them to a market, sold them at a greatly
enhanced value to the defendant. In an action to recover for this conversion, the measure of damage is the value of the logs at the place of severance,
with interest from the date of cutting, unaffected by any enhancement of
value through transportation or by labor, etc., bestowed upon them by the
innocent trespasser. Wall v. Holloman, 72 S. E. Rep. 369 (N. Car., 1911).
The disputed point in cases of this nature is whether the plaintiff's
proprietary rights iifhis goods should be compensated for at their value
when taken, or at their value when sold by the innocent trespasser, who
has expended labor and time thereon, and paid the cost of transportation,
as a result of which their marketable value has been greatly enhanced.
The decisions upon this question are greatly at variance. The -decision
in the .principal case that the innocent purchaser for value should be pro"tected as far as possible and the plaintiff compensated only for what he has
actually lost is supported by the cases in Maine, Pennsylvania, Maryland
and Wisconsin. The leading case taking this view is Weymouth v. Railroad,
'17 Wis. 58o (1863).
A dissenting opinion in Wall v. Holloman, supra, adopts the other point
of view, which would extend all the reimbursement possible to the plaintiff.
It is supported by decisions in Florida, Minnesota, Michigan, and by dicta
in Wooden Ware Co. v. United States, io6 U. S. 432 (1882). The reasons
adduced for the superior merit of this rule are, perhaps, not as powerful on
analysis as they appear at first sight. In the first place, great stress is laid
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upon the fact that the defendant, after paying the value of the property
to the true owner, can recover from the trespasser or intermediate vendor
upon an implied warranty of title. But under the first rule, which the court
followed in our principal case, the defendant will have an action also
against the trespasser; and, in the event of insolvency on the part of the
latter, the innocent purchaser would lose far less than under the second
rule.
The other objection to the rule advanced by the dissenting opinion lies
in the unnecessary hardship it inflicts upon the innocent trespasser. Under
this doctrine the unconscious and unintentional converter of the property
of another can obtain no benefit whatever from the labor and expense
he has bestowed in good faith upon what he honestly believed to be his
own property.
Under the rule of the majority of the court the plaintiff is reimbursed
for his lost goods at their precise value when taken and therefore sustains
no loss; the innocent trespasser, after answering to the defendant in a
suit for the actual cost of the goods-their original value when taken-is
not deprived of the fruits of his labor expended in good faith upon property
he considered his own; and the defendant, after recovery from the trespasser, has sustained no loss whatever.
For a complete discussion of the whole subject see Coal Co. v. Cox, 39
Md. i (1873) and Mining Co. v. Heston, 26 Am. Rep. 521 (1877), and
cases reviewed therein.
TORTS-NEGLIGENcE-DOCTrINE

OF "LAST

CLEAR CHANCE."-A railroad

company negligently backed a train through a city without providing any
signal of warning or look-out on the cars. The plaintiff negligently ran over
a crossing just in front of the train and, managing to grasp an iron bar on
one of the cars, was carried along for some distance without being seen by
the train crew. He finally fell off and was badly injured. In a suit against
the railroad the court, two judges dissenting, held that the doctrine of the
"last clear chance" did not apply and that the company was not liable.
Bourrett v. Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co., 132 N. W. Rep. 973 (Ia. 1pI1).
The majority opinion takes the view that the doctrine of the "last clear
chance" isfounded on actual knowledge of the plaintiff's danger, irrespective
of whether or not it was the defendant's duty to have provided means of
knowledge. This interpretation is followed in New York, N. H. & H. R.
Co. v. Kelley, 93 Fed. 745 (1899); Sweeney v. N. Y. Steam. Co., 117 N. Y.
642 (i89o); Milwaukee Electric R. & Light Co., Io8 Wis. 593 (igoi), and in
cases in Arkansas, Colorado and Montana. Some states declare that under
this doctrine the defendant is liable only if chargeable with wantonness or
recklessness. Frazer v. South & North Ala. R. C., 8o Ala. io5 (1886);
Mulherin v. Delaware, L. & W. R. Co., 8i Pa. 366 (1877); and cases in
Indiana, Louisiana and Oregon.
The dissenting opinion, however, seems to be in accord with the weight
of authority. The judges considered the defendant liable because the injury
resulted from the omission of an act which constituted a breach of duty owed
to the plaintiff, namely, to have a look-out and to give warning at crossings.
Without this breach of duty the plaintiff would not have been injured, and
when there is a duty to investigate, reasonable means of knowledge should
be regarded as equivalent to actual knowledge. In accordance with this
view are Smith v. Norfolk & Southern R. Co., 114 N. C. 728 (894); Richmond v. Sacramento Valley R. Co., i8 Cal. 351 (I86i); Battisbull v.
Humphreys, 64 Mich. 514 (1889); Edgerley v. Union Street R. Co., 67 N. H.
312 (i894); Virginia Midland R. Co. v. White, 84 Va. 498 (i889); the
decisions in Kansas, Kentucky, Maryland, Mississippi, Nevada, Utah and
West Virginia; and England in Davies v. Mann, 6 M. & W. 545 (i855), where
the doctrine originated. The better rule, it is submitted, is followed in these
decisions, which hold the defendant liable for any omission of duty, whether
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before or after the discovery of the peril in which the plaintiff had placed
himself by his antecedent negligence, if that breach of duty intervened or
continued after the negligence of the other party had ceased. Beach on
Contrib. Negligence, sec. 28; Shearman v. Redfield on Negligence, sec. 99;
Davies v. Mann, supra. For an exhaustive review of the entire subject see
the note under Bogan v. Carolina Central R. R. Co., 55 L. R. A. 418 (N. C.
Igoi).
TORTS-NEGLIGENcE-LIABILITY OF, SERVANTS TO THnR PERSONS FOR NoNFEAsANcE.-Although the point was not directly raised, the Kentucky Court
of Appeals in a recent case discussed the liability of a servant or agent to
third parties for injuries sustained by reason of his non-feasance of his
duties, and, affirming previous decisions, took the position that such a liability existed. Cincinnati, N. 0. & T. P. R. Co., 140 S. W. Rep. 176 (i911).
There are three distinct lines of decisions on this question, in each of
which the liability or non-liability is based upon a different ground. The
first group of cases holds that non-feasance by a servant or agent is merely
negligence in the performance of a duty arising from some implied or express
contract with his principal or employer. Accordingly the agent or servant is
responsible to him only and not to any third person. Such is the view-in
the leading case of Delaney v. Rochereau, 34 La. Ann. 1123 (1882), and in
Colvin v. Holbrook, 2 N. Y. 126 (1863) ; Brown v. Lent, 2o Vt. 529 (849) ;
Henshaw v. Noble, 7 Ohio St. 231 (1858) ; and Lane v. Cotton, 12 Mod. 488
(Eng. 1796). See also Mechem on Agency, sec. 539, and Story on Agency,
sec. 309.
Cases taking the intermediate ground declare that, while for absolute
non-feasance there is no liability, nevertheless if the agent or servant once
undertakes a duty, he must use reasonable care in carrying it out so as not
to injure third parties; and if, by reason of his improper execution, neglect
or abandonment of the undertaking after having entered upon it, outside
persons are injured, he will be liable. Osborne v. Morgan, 130 Mass. io2
(188o). The distinction, it is submitted, is extremely fine, and courts which
follow this view have become deeply involved in the endeavor to distinguish
such cases from those of simple non-feasance or misfeasance. See Ellis v.
McNaughton, 76 Mich. 237 (i89o); Campbell v. Portland Sugar Co., 62 Me.
552 (i875); Lottman v. Barnett, 62 Mo. 159 (1876).
The third class of cases bases the liability of the servant for non-feasance
upon the same grounds as his liability for misfeasance. That is, the liability is not regarded as being in any way connected with his contract, but as
resting solely upon the common law obligation devolving upon every responsithe present estate (see Stimson Amer. St. Law, sec. 1403), no exactly similar
he operates his own property as principal or that of another as agent or
servant. Such is the rule in Baird v. Shipman, 132 Ill. i6 (189i); Mayer
v. Thompson-Hutchinson Bldg. Co., 104 Ala. 6i (i894); Ellis v. Southern
Ry. Co., 72 S. C. 465 (i9o5). For a brief general review of the entire subject
see Lough v. John Davis Co., 30 Wash. 204, 59 L. R. A. 802 (i9o2).

